Showing posts with label Indian Armed Forces. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Indian Armed Forces. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 14, 2015

NDTV Pulls Down Former Navy Chief’s ‘Explosive’ Interview

NDTV Pulls Down Former Navy Chief’s ‘Explosive’ Interview

NDTV takes down its interview with Admiral DK Joshi after receiving complaints for defamatory content.

    NDTV Pulls down newslaudnry













After subjecting its viewers to incompetent reporting during the Kashmir floods and mawkish coverage of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US, NDTV finally got an interview worth going to town with. Unfortunately, they have had to pull the story down from their website. We have a statement from Editorial Director of NDTV, Sonia Singh, on the reason, but first the background.
The story in question is a particularly explosive interview that Nitin Gokhale, NDTV’sSecurity and Strategic Affairs Editor, conducted with former Navy Chief Admiral DK Joshi in which he launched a scathing attack on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime and on the media for misreporting.
An excerpt of the interview in which the ex-naval chief slams the UPA is still up on NDTV’swebsite as a segment in Group Editor Barkha Dutt’s show, The Buck Stops Here.
However, subsequent parts in which he indicts the media for trashy reporting have been removed from the channel’s website along with the complete interview altogether.
NDTV removed page newslaundry
This was the first interview the former naval chief gave to a media house after resigning in February 2014, owning “moral responsibility” following a fire incident aboard INS Sindhurakshak. In the beginning of the interview, Admiral Joshi, in a severe comment on the MoD under the UPA, stated that he was “amused” at the haste with which his resignation was accepted. He said his immediate reason for quitting was the dysfunctional and inefficient model with which the armed forces have been burdened. Urging for reforms in higher defence management, he also stated that authority must rest with those who are accountable, that is men in the service and not the ministry.
This part of the interview was excerpted and aired first on the prime-time show The Buck Stops Here under a segment titled – “Accountability minus authority: Ex-Navy Chief’s explosive disclosures”. But the complete interview with more telling remarks on the media was carried a day later on October 15, and it got Twitter talking when the complete transcript along with the video of the interview was uploaded on Thursday morning.
Without mincing any words, Admiral Joshi stated that the media gave into sensationalism while reporting on issues, including the Sindhurakshak mishap. As examples he talked about a newspaper that “invented the coup theory” and followed it by saying “…this reporter was darling of the foreign vendors, and to show his importance he would author articles like the reporter is in country abc at the invitation of xyz”.
He spoke in detail of other papers that misreport and so-called defence correspondents who lack basic knowledge and pretty much pass off blatant lies as news reports. Within a day of the Admiral’s statements making waves on social media, NDTV removed the complete interview from its website. This, of course, only got more people talking about the interview and why the channel would remove it.
Meanwhile, when asked on Twitter about the interview being taken down, Dutt seemed ignorant about it being removed and pointed to her show that focused on the admiral’s criticism of UPA.
We tried getting in touch with Nitin Gokhale to know if there were any specific reasons for removing the interview. He asked us to check with Editorial Director Sonia Singh and Barkha Dutt.
We then sent an email to Singh asking her if there was any specific reason for taking down the interview and whether Admiral Joshi’s severe criticism of certain journalists had anything to do with the channel removing the interview – considering that one of the bylines on the “coup” story was that of journalist Shekhar Gupta who is all set to start a new season of Walk The Talk on NDTV. Singh without going into much detail replied: “We received a complaint regarding potential defamatory content in the interview, which is why it has been taken down. Our legal department is having a look and we will take a call after that.”
Considering Dutt’s show, that focused on the UPA-bashing part of the interview, is still very much there on the website, it is fair to assume the complaint for defamatory content could not have come from anyone in the UPA. And since the rest of the interview has Admiral Joshi mostly raging against journalists, it is possible and probable the complaint has come from one of the media people he has accused of careless reporting.
Meanwhile, we will keep you updated on what NDTV’s legal team decides to do with the interview — take it down forever or put it back up on the website. And for those of you who missed the interview, fret not. The Admiral’s interview has popped up on YouTube and you can watch it here. Thank you, ‘appy (@janonymous14) for alerting us.

https://youtu.be/kurE1XHgYAE

Monday, September 28, 2015

#OROP Messed up - False Mathematics of OROP Exposed

#OROP Messed up

False Mathematics of OROP Exposed 

Karan Kharb
Satyagraha, agitation and public demonstration of resentment do not go well with military ethos, much less the frequently traded politics of violence and coercive tactics like rail/rasta roko campaigns. Even though the traditional awe inspiring chivalrous image of the soldiery has been greatly dented in India, the public still looks upon its soldiers as men of very high discipline, sense of duty, commitment and valour who would spontaneously respond to their call without caring for their own safety and comfort whenever required. Trusting and respecting the authority has been ingrained in the soldier’s conscience for ages and they take the leader’s countenance on its face value.  Ironically, it was 1973, soon after the historic victory in 1971 when India’s military might dismembered Pakistan and niched a new nation – Bangladesh – on the world map, that the pension scales of military personnel were ruthlessly slashed by 30 per cent as a consequence of the 3rd Pay Commission recommendations. To rub salt on this cut, civil pension scales were raised by 20 per cent. What a reward for the resounding victory! Military men groaned and whined privately but endured it and moved on!
Through the successive years, military personnel continued losing their privileges, status, salary and pension. The Ex-servicemen felt short-changed with each successive Pay Commission. The 6th Pay Commission report added fuel to the already simmering ire of the ex-servicemen. Their quiet representations failed to fructify despite courts and authorities finding their demands genuine and reasonable. They started raising their voice against this injustice. In every case that went to the court, the judiciary upheld their case and indicted the official dispensation. Yet, instead of one rank one pension (OROP), what they received from the UPA government was a ferrying point from ‘disparity’ to ‘modified parity’ as if both were synonyms of equality.  Col (retd) Inderjit Singh, an octogenarian torch bearer of one rank one pension (OROP) agitation today along with Lt Gen (retd) Balbir Singh and Maj Gen (retd) Satbir Singh, says he has made presentations to all the Defence Ministers and Prime Ministers since the days of Indira Gandhi.  They all agreed but forty two years on the 2.5 million ESM are still waiting to get their dues. The mood of the ESM was becoming rebellious and needed to be channelized into a peaceful movement.
Eminent Ex-servicemen organisations like the Indian Ex-Services League (IESL) and the Indian Ex-servicemen Movement (IESM) led by Lt Gen Balbir Singh (retd) and Maj Gen Satbir Singh (retd) respectively became the rallying points for the anguished Ex-servicemen of the country. IESL, founded in 1964 enjoys the honour of having celebrities like Gen KS Thimaya and Field Marshal KM Cariappa as its first two Presidents. Although demonstrations and protest marches by the ESM were earlier led by Lt Gen Raj Kadyan (retd) since 2007, the United Front of Ex-servicemen (UFESM) was formed only recently by rallying together the state units of ESM organisations under the aegis of IESL and IESM to spearhead the OROP Movement in a united peaceful and non-violent manner.
Taking note of the growing anguish among the ESM and the Armed Forces at the widening pension disparities, the Rajya Sabha constituted a Parliamentary Committee in 2010 to look into the petitions and make specific recommendations. The Parliamentary Committee, that came to be famously known as the Koshyari Committee deriving the name from its Chairman, BJP’s Rajya Sabha MP Bhagat Singh Koshiyari, recorded, “there is merit in the demand for One Rank One Pension by Armed Forces Personnel” and strongly recommended that, “Government should implement OROP in the defence forces across the board at the earliest and further that for future, the pay, allowances, pension, family pension, etc. in respect of the defence personnel should be determined by a separate commission so that their peculiar terms.” These recommendations were unanimously accepted and approved by the Parliament in 2011. However, only crumbs were served to the ex-soldiers in the name of OROP and not even a military member was taken in the 7th Pay Commission, let alone a separate Commission for the Armed Forces. The UPA government did try to pacify the irate ESM by narrowing the gap between the new and old pensioners in 2010 and 2013. In what was then seen as a dirty trick to divide officers and junior commissioned officers and other ranks (JCOs/OR), the UPA government nearly bridged the gaps only in respect of JCOs/OR leaving the officers’ case unaddressed. Military bonding being what it is, the unity could not be breached and the joint struggle for OROP continued. In its last days in office, the UPA Government (MoD) issued a letter on 26 Feb 2014 to the three Chiefs of the Armed Forces defining OROP in explicit terms: “OROP implies that uniform pension be paid to the Armed Forces personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service irrespective of their date of retirement and any future enhancement in the rates of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners.”
During the pre-election campaign, the BJP leaders had repeated derided the UPA Government for giving ex-soldiers the short-shrift and Narendra Modi, the would be Prime Minister, assured that he would implement OROP soon after forming his government at the Centre.  His blitzkrieg visits to military stations inspired a new enthusiasm among the military personnel. Last year he celebrated his Diwali with the troops at Siachen Glacier where he declared, “I am proud and happy that Providence has destined OROP to be delivered through my hands.” More than a year and a half of the Modi Sarkar in office, however, yielded nothing except promises now punctuated with complexities and huge financial burden. Economists and bureaucrats joined in to work out daunting figures that apparently scared the Prime Minister himself. Is the financial burden of OROP really as scary as it is being made out to be? Thorough analysis of the military pension bill reveals that the exaggeration is nothing but a propaganda to deny the soldiery what is their rightful due as is evident from the details of the Defence Pension Bill explained below.
Financial Mole Hill, Not a Mountain!  
Initial pay-out of OROP including arrears earlier assumed to take effect at the ‘top of the scale’ as on April 1, 2004 and if paid on April 1, 2015 stood at Rs 8,294 crore. Whereas the ongoing delay in implementation would have marginally bloated this amount, it would now be considerably reduced in view of the Government proposing to calculate OROP dues at the average of pension rates that existed in calendar year 2013. Further, the roll out is also proposed to be effective not from April 1 but July 1, 2014. By this decision the Government the projected OROP budget will be further reduced by approximately Rs 2100 crore. Adding the previously budgeted and unspent amount of Rs 1000 crore to it, an amount of Rs 3100 crore could be reduced from Rs 8300 crore estimated in the table below. Yet, the arbitrary figures ranging from Rs 10,000 crore to 22,000 crore have been extravagantly and quite frequently fed to the media and public magnifying a financial mole hill as if it were an unsurmountable mountain.  It is, therefore, necessary to remove this illusion of so-called ‘unaffordable financial burden’ by explaining the primary figures of military pension vis-à-vis the future effect of OROP:-
Ser NoDetailsAmount (in INR crores)
Total ‘Defence Pensions’ Budget (2014-15)
(a)                        Share of Defence Civilians (37%)
(b)                        Share of Armed Forces Pensioners (63%)
54500
20165
34335
Subtract one time pay-outs like Gratuity, Leave encashment, commutation etc15000 1
Net Pension load as it exists in pre-OROP budget19335
Total OROP rounded up to nearest thousand (Initial outgo including arrears assuming 01 April 2014 as effective date from which dues become payable) 8300 2
Enhanced OROP share for the next year (0.85% of serial 3) 164 3
Notes:-
  1. One time pay out includes pensioner’s gratuity and allied entitlements which are neither part of OROP not affected by increase/decrease in OROP. 
  2. Now with effective date being 01 Jul 2014 and OROP being fixed at average of maximum and minimum scales of pension paid during calendar year 2013, this amount will substantially reduce by approximately Rs 2100 crore!)
  3. This amount is estimated to decline @ 1/5th every year until the net OROP effect becomes Zero in the 5th
Amusing as it might appear to some learned analysts, the OROP burden will decline every successive year rather than escalating. Normal escalation rate of pension budget shall, of course, continue to be determined by other existing factors other than the OROP incremental effect. It might appear strange to those who have heard that every year thousands of military pensioners are added to the existing 2.6 million and, therefore, so much more pension burden is added to the annual pension budget. But there is a catch in it. The 6th Pay Commission had resorted to ‘bunching’ of service seniority of military personnel in different trades for the purpose of fixing their pay scales in respective pay band. As a consequence, these personnel are now retiring drawing pension at the ‘bunched’ scale despite the number of their years in service being different. These bunched categories are now in their last leg of service and would taper off in another 4-5 years. Thanks to this ‘bunching effect’, the enhanced proportion of OROP will diminish rather than escalate every year.
Civil-Military Trust Deficit   
Much has been made of the OROP demand by the bureaucratic machinations to paint it as an unreasonable and, therefore, undeserved demand of country’s 2.6 million ex-soldiers, war widows, war wounded and battle disabled.  Selective leaks from official sources clearly indicate an organised attempt to deny the Armed Forces their basic due. Last minute insertion of ‘VRS’ in the Defence Minister’s press release on September 5 is the latest example of innumerable mischiefs that happen insidiously as a routine at the MoD.  The government had been consulting Lt Gen Balbir Singh (retd) and Maj Gen Satbir Singh (retd) – the two leaders of the OROP Movement – and Rajeev Chandrashekhar, MP and interlocutor to bring about a mutually acceptable settlement on OROP. While all other issues like base year, roll-out date, periodicity of review, ‘top of the scale’ fixation etc were discussed at length but ‘VRS’ had never figured during these conclaves. Obviously, because there is no such thing as ‘VRS’ in the military service. Yet, it quietly and ridiculously sneaked at the last moment in Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s press release alarming a section of military pensioners who took pre-mature retirement (PMR) who assumed the bureaucratic ignorance of difference between the two terms – VRS and PMR – to be a design to deny them their rightful dues.
  Recently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was quoted having said in Chandigarh that “the credit of giving Rs. 10,000 crore OROP to the military pensioners should go the poor.” The comment has been construed to imply as if enormous funds meant for the poor of the country were being diverted to the military pensioners. “Ham apne desh vasiyon ke liye mar to sakte hain lekin unka haq kabhi nahi mar sakte. Aisa kahna to hamare jale par namak chhidakne jaisa hai”, retired Subedar Major Inder Singh of Jat Regiment said at Jantar Mantar on September 12.
In an editorial, Business Standard (New Delhi, September 6) commented, “Also, those in the armed forces frequently retire early, meaning that at any one point there may be multiple retired servicemen for every one still in uniform. This in itself is enough to increase the fiscal burden. By some estimates, it would double or even triple the existing net present value of servicemen’s pensions.” What does it suggest? Soldiers should not retire early? To be a competent, robust and dependable war fighting force, military has to maintain youthful profile. Early retirement including premature retirement is therefore a measure to ensure this paramount requirement. Lateral absorption of the retiring trained, disciplined and experienced soldiers into civil and police services has been recommended by authorities and Pay Commissions but continues to be resisted by the destination organisations and departments. It is highly demotivating for the serving solders when they see their seniors retiring in their late 30s and 40s – a stage in life when their domestic responsibilities and expanding expenses like care of old parents, house construction, marriage of dependent siblings, kids’ education are at their peak and income drastically reduced.  On the other hand those who joined civil or police service around the same time continue to serve for another 20 years or more getting the benefit of regularly enhanced salaries, promotions and at least two Pay Commission awards more than the military pensioners.
Suggestions that military personnel also should be brought under the contributory pension scheme (NPS) introduced for the Centre and State services in 2004 is also not a practicable solution because military personnel cannot avail of the scheme as advantageously as their counterparts in the civil government jobs because of early retirement of military personnel.
Is the financial burden of military pensions really going beyond nation’s affordability? A scrutiny of growth trends in the defence budgets vis-à-vis GDP allays these fears. Even as there is always a quantum increase in the defence budget, total allocation for defence spending including salaries and pensions has actually recorded a decrease from 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2014.  As per World Bank statistics, GDP in India averaged $ 550.27 billion from 1970 until 2014, reaching an all-time high of $ 2066.90 billion in 2014 and a record low of $ 63.50 billion in 1970. Whereas average growth rate of India’s GDP has been 1.66 between 1996 and 2015, it grew from 4.6 in 2013 to 7 in Jul 2015. India’s defence budget (Rs 2,46,727 crore for FY 2015-16) on the contrary, declined from 2.7 in 2010 to 2.4 per cent of GDP in 2014. Interestingly, Pakistan, Israel and the US allocated 3.4, 5.2, and 3.5 per cent of their GDP respectively for the same period. Alarm bells calling OROP financials ‘unaffordable financial burden’ for the country are therefore preposterous, false and perhaps even scandalous to short-change the soldier.
Integrated functioning of MoD with Military, emphasised from time to time by experts including the Kargil Review Committee, is yet to see light of the day. According to K Subramanyam, India’s noted strategic thinker and Chairman, Kargil Review Committee, “the present structure of civil-military relations lies lost in a system where politicians enjoy power without responsibility, bureaucrats wield power without accountability, and the military assumes responsibility without direction.”  Such a state is not conducive to harmonious functioning in the modern threat scenario particularly at a time when India is aspiring for bigger roles across borders and seas. The prevailing climate of civil-military trust deficit has already taken a toll of operational preparedness with stagnating modernisation and resource crunch. Higher military leadership is already under stress in the face of evolving threats and degrading morale and manpower.
Review Money guzzling Projects 
                At a time when the Finance Ministry and economists are raising alarm over OROP, if fails prudence why no attention is seen being paid to tons of money going down the drain through subsidies, food security, MNRGA and so on.  An amount of Rs 2.27 lakh crore ($37 billion) has been budgeted by Finance Minister Arun Jaitley for major subsidies like food, petroleum and fertilizers for the current fiscal. In his address on August 15 this year, the Prime Minister said that as a consequence of direct credit of gas subsidy adopted last year, as much as Rs 15,000 crore was saved in the first year itself. There is enormous scope to save and utilise the enormous funds being swindled from populist schemes by streamlining the distribution and accounting.
A CAG sample survey report published in July 2012 stated that only 3.2 per cent of the target households under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) have benefited from the scheme. This means that 96.8% of the corpus spent on this most ambitious social sector scheme launched in Independent India’s history, might be going down the drain. Since the 1980s when Rajiv Gandhi said that of every rupee spent in welfare projects by the government only 15 paise reached the beneficiaries. Subsequent studies have shown that the average utilisation figure may be still lower at around 6% only. The finance minister has enhanced budgetary allocation for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) to Rs 34,699 crore from Rs 34,000 crore last year despite government’s awareness of funds going astray. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had eloquently derided it in the Parliament saying, “MNREGA is a living epitome of your (the Congress’s) failures. After 60 years, the people of this country are being compelled to dig ditches.”
In the light of the above facts, it would be more appropriate for the Finance Minister to mobilise an effective mechanism to throttle corruption and rake in surplus money from these corruption zones rather than squeeze and starve India’s military and our war heroes who gave their life’s best in fighting and dying for the nation. As if answering the Finance Minister’s SOS call and concern over OROP, RBI Board of Directors has approved transfer of a surplus of Rs 65,896 for the current year.  Although even full implementation of OROP will not cost more than Rs 9,000 crore, there is enough for the Finance Minister to mobilise tens of thousands of crores. And I have not yet talked of the progress made on black money!
                All arguments for and against OROP notwithstanding, agitation, protest rallies, fasts and sreet sloganeering rasp sensitivities of old soldiers. Taking to streets for getting their genuine dues is against established military ethos. Soldiers are not known to be self-seekers. They are groomed to save and protect others even at the cost of their own their own life. The same ethos, however, also instils in a soldier’s psyche the courage to fight for justice. He does not want an ounce extra, would happily forego his own share for the nation and the needy whenever called upon to, but he hates to be cheated and denied his dues. In the times of modern communication technology and connectivity, images and utterances of the protesting ESM at Jantar Mantar become viral on social media and carry the risk of infecting military personnel deployed far away. Temperamentally, military veterans abhor public demonstration and protests. In the instant case, they came out to protest when 40 years of patient appeals and peaceful representations failed to yield despite judiciary upholding their demands. The government must therefore institutionalise a mechanism to monitor military sensitivities and address their problems ensuring timely fulfilment of their genuine needs so as to dissuade them from staging public protests and rallies.
                Long ago, Chanakya had advised Chandragupta Maurya, “while the citizenry of the State contributes to see that the State prospers and flourishes, the soldier guarantees it continues to EXIST as a State. To this man, O Rajadhiraja, you owe a debt. Please, therefore, see to it, on your own, that the soldier gets his dues regularly in every form and respect, be they his needs or his wants for he is not likely to ask for them himself.”   Kautilya, known also as Chanakya, gave his king this blunt warning: “The day the soldier has to demand his dues will be a sad day for Magadha for then, on that day, you will have lost all moral sanction to be king.”

Thursday, May 12, 2011

One Rank One Pension – An Approach

I am forwarding a paper By Alan O'Leary for your info -an insider's view of the scheming that goes on. As you know Alan was Chairman of the Services Pay Commission Cell until he asked to be relieved due to too much interference in his job by 'outsiders'. I believe he was replaced by a Maj Gen Kundu.

Chew on it. It is an eye-opener. The villain of the piece is of course Sushama Nath, who was Secy to the 6CPC.

The Chairman is also largely to blame -
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Dear Sirs,
There is a lot of talk about OROP. I do not profess to be an expert on pensions, but during my innings with the PARC in the Sixth CPC, came to learn of some of the intrigue. Hence I made out an abridged paper, that I thought you might read.
Warm Regards,
Alan
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22 April 2011
One Rank One Pension – An Approach
By Rear Admiral Alan O’Leary (Retd)
Ex -Chairman PARC Sixth CPC

Introduction:
1. For sometime past, I have contemplated putting my thoughts together on OROP (One rank, one pension) and penning them down, in such a way that the reader could appreciate the nuances of the subject, that would eventually lead to some of our intellectuals ,examining the issue in its entirety and determining a way ahead. It would be presumptuous on my part to assume, that I could put all the facts down, but am attempting to focus on the main issues, that I feel could be brought into our case. I would like to place on record, that I am in full agreement with the article written by Group Capt AG Bewoor, on 21 Mar 11, that was circulated on the IESM network.

Complications - OROP:
2. OROP, is not a simple issue, which has been further complicated by the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission, in a similar fashion as was done in the Fourth Pay Commission, when a vertical Pay Band, created ostensibly, to address stagnation in the ranks of Armed Forces officers, up to the rank of Brigadier, laid the cornerstone for denigration of ranks, within the Armed Forces. This happened, because Rank pay was introduced up to the rank of Brigadier but was subsumed from the replacement scale, instead of being given over and above the replacement scale (this is the famous Major Dhanapalan case for which a final decision is awaited from the Supreme Court). Furthermore, because Major Generals and above did not get Rank pay, those Major Generals who retired prior to the fourth CPC, found their pensions lower than that of a Brigadier, which was much later brought at par. Some justice.

3. The Sixth Pay Commission, introduced pay promotions, for the All India Services and the Organised Group A services, on a non-functional basis up to the HAG Grade, but did not consider it fit to extend this largesse to officers of the Armed Forces whose pay traditionally was at par with the Organised Group A services.

Functioning of the Pay Commission:
4. I will not delve on why OROP is required. This aspect has been clearly brought out by Group Capt Bewoor. One aspect of his article however is worth mentioning and I will restate it. He, like all members of the Services Pay Cells, in the Sixth Pay Commission, always wondered why, the Pay Commission (and subsequently those same individuals, who continued to function in the Finance Ministry, after the Pay Commission was wound up) in examining the issues relating to Fauji's, came out with solutions, “crafted with deliberate cussedness and meanness". All Pay Commissions (3, 4, 5 and 6) had Armed Forces Pay Cells that interacted with the Pay Commission. Some to a greater extent and some to a lesser extent. I understand that in the Fifth Pay Commission, there was hardly any interaction. What was common in all cases, however, was the fact that the Armed Forces Pay Cells, had dedicated and competent Officers, who did their homework and in no time at all, could present their cases, or clarify issues to the Pay Commission.

5. The Pay Commissions were always headed by an eminent Jurist, but there was no opportunity given to the Armed Forces Pay Cells, to clarify issues or to defend themselves, during the proceedings, with him present. The whole exercise was carried out behind closed doors at the whims of bureaucrats in the commission. The Armed Forces were never informed of the devious methodologies being determined, that would always put them on the back foot. If they were, I am sure many of the anomalies could have been easily resolved, before the recommendations were finalised. The Sixth CPC even boasted, that for quicker decision making (and secrecy) their Officer complement was kept to a minimum. Their final recommendations, were given to the Armed Forces Pay Cells the night before the recommendations were placed in the public domain, at a dinner hosted by them, at the India International Centre. I am saying this, so that the reader can understand, why it was necessary for the Armed Forces Pay Cells, to try and get back what was denied in the first instance. Furthermore, as I already stated, the same individuals who crafted the Sixth CPC recommendations, were promptly appointed to the Finance Ministry, so that they could continue their mission to sidestep and deflect our objections, which they did with considerable success.

Unfinished agenda of the Sixth CPC:
6. In my first e-mail, I had mentioned, that there were two issues that bothered me the most and which were swept under the carpet. The first, concerned the status of Lt Colonels, who being in a higher Pay Scale compared to civil servants (equivalent to Commandant in the Para military services) prior to the Sixth CPC, were given a lower Grade Pay of Rs 8000, instead of Rs 8700. The second and equally vital issue was the introduction of a methodology to isolate the Service Officer from the largesse proposed for Organised Group A Officers. The latter, would ensure that during the currency of the Sixth CPC, almost all officers of the Organised Group A services, would cross the rubicon of Pay Band 4 and move to HAG, whereas 99% Service Officers will be stuck in Pay Band 4. Sadly, though the PARC had got the COSC approval (July 2008), to place on record the objections of the Armed Forces to the Government, this has not been progressed. This, if not ironed out, will have very serious consequences for the Pay equivalence and status of Armed Forces Officers in the future. It also means that the Civil Services have taken our lead and given unto themselves OROP, which is at the moment enjoyed by Lt Generals and above, who are placed in HAG and HAG +. A mere 0.02% of the Officer cadre in the Armed Forces, vis a vis 100% of Officers from the Organised Group A services. I would also like to point out, that PARC had fought and brought Lt Generals (non C-in-C) into HAG. They were earlier also in Pay Band 4. Thus, within the same Pay Band, the difference in pay (Lt Col to Lt Gen), were the increments on account of length of Service and Grade Pay. For pensions for those who retired prior to 1 Jan 2006, the difference in pension between a Lt Colonel and Lt General was half the difference of Grade Pay. This changed only subsequently for Lt Generals (non C-in-C).

Pay promotions for IAS Officers and other Organised Group A services on a Non-Functional basis:
7. The Govt have approved the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission, (Art 3.3.12, Page 174, of the Sixth CPC recommendations) which states, “The Govt. should consider batch-wise parity while empanelling and\or posting at Centre between respective batches of the IAS and other Organised Group A services, with the gap being restricted to 2 years. Whenever any IAS Officer of a particular batch is posted in the Centre to a particular grade, carrying a specific grade pay in PB 3 or PB 4, grant of a higher Pay Scale on non-functional basis to officers belonging to batches of organised Group A services, that are senior by two years or more, should be given by the Government”. Subsequently, the Govt. have also clarified that an Officer in the civil services, who has completed 5 years in the SAG grade will be given a pay promotion to the HAG scale on a non-functional basis.

8. In connection with the above, I would like to add that a Joint Secy to the Govt of India and a Major General equivalent, are SAG officers, but in protocol are higher than SAG officers of the Organised Group A services, who are not appointed to the post of Joint Secy to the Govt of India. This means, that an Organised Group A Service Officer, will attain SAG grade in 18 years (2 years astern of the IAS). He will not be equivalent to a Major General in protocol but would move up to the HAG grade (Lt General) on a non functional, pay promotion basis in 23 years, whereas a Brigadier if selected, is promoted to Major General in 32 years (SAG grade) and in most cases will retire in that grade. A mere 30% of Major Generals will attain HAG grade. The other Major Generals retiring in the SAG grade even though they may have completed 5 years of service in that grade. Is such a gross disparity acceptable to the Armed Forces?

9. The above provisions, made by the IAS for themselves and the Organised Group A services, will keep them laughing all the way to the bank, not only in their service career, but also in their retirement. These provisions facilitate them leap frogging to higher posts on a non functional basis, with the pay of higher posts, whereas the Armed Forces Officer stagnates in rank and at the end of it all, 99% will retire in Pay Band 4.The question is, how is it that pay promotions on a non functional basis, are within the realm of reasonability, when it pertains to the IAS and Organised Group A services, but is absolutely unacceptable for the Armed Forces. This disparity and bias I am sure, is without precedent anywhere in the world. One of the specious arguments used by the Finance Ministry is that, consequent to the AVS Committee report, Majors are promoted to Lt Colonel in 13 years, by time. How unholy an unorthodox, but are they able to explain how they have gone even further for the civil services in their proposals at Article 3.3.12. Is it an acceptable logic that IAS Officers are mature enough to attain the SAG grade in 16 years (maximum), whereas Armed Forces officers need 32 years to reach the same level?. Yet another oft repeated, half truth, is that Armed Forces officers are commissioned at the age of 20 years and IAS Officers join at 28 years. In other words, the Armed Forces Officer has to pay the price of qualifying earlier, after meeting the graduation criteria and also getting through the Services Selection Board and still losing out to the Organised Group A services Officer. What they conveniently gloss over, is that they enjoy a full career up to 60 years and beyond, whereas 99% of Armed Forces officers, retire between 54 to 58 years. Furthermore, the IAS lobby ensures that 90% of their kin continue to serve in various capacities in the Government up to the age of 65 and beyond. A case for raising the retirement age of Civil Government servants to 65 years is in fact being currently considered by the DoP&T.

10. One aspect, always brought out by the Finance Ministry, is that all those who joined the Civil Services, post 1 January 2004, will be governed by a New pension scheme that is self contributory, unlike the Armed Forces that continue to enjoy a pension scheme. First of all, nobody can say for certain, that there will be no change of policy in 2024. Secondly, this does not make martyrs of those who joined the Civil Services, before 1 January 2004 for which they need to give themselves fast track pay promotions and eventually the highest slab to retire from.

Key Issues-OROP:
11. The following are the main reasons for OROP: -
· Giving the Armed Forces officer, the same pay promotions on a non-functional basis, as approved by the Govt, for the All India Services and the Organised Group A services (Article 3.3.12 of the Sixth CPC report).

· Reducing the disparity in pensions, between those who retire in the currency of a Pay Commission and those who retired earlier.
· Ensuring that an Armed forces officer is correctly compensated for his length of service and rank in which he retired (Comparable to the Organised Group A services).
· Rationalising the pension gaps between ranks, with special emphasis on those ranks in which a large number of officers retire (Major and Lt Col).
· Bridging the pension gaps, resulting from the skewed imbalance, caused by adjusting all ranks from Major General and below, within Pay Band 3 & 4. This is further compounded, as pre 1 January 2006 pensioners, are brought down to the minimum of the Band in which they retired and the difference in pensions being half the difference of Grade Pay.
· Addressing the issue of Armed Forces officers, stagnating below, Joint Secy level, due to their traditional rank structures and denying them pay promotions, at par with the changes invoked for the All India Services and Organised Group A services. This, despite the fact that successive Pay Commissions have ruled that parity needs to be maintained between the Armed Forces and the Organised Group A services.
· Stepping up (notionally) the pensions of Majors who retired in the previous pay commissions and who are now affected in their present pensions, which are based on 13 years of service, whereas these officers in the past had served at least 20 years before they took premature retirement.
· Protection to retired Armed Forces officers whose pensionary status has been reduced, consequent to Cadre reviews of the Organised Group A services, thereby upsetting the parity that existed at the time of their retirement (Status of a Lt Col, who retired prior to the Sixth CPC, was higher than a Commandant in the para military forces. There is thus no reason why, these officer’s pension should now be lower than a Commandant of the para military forces).

Pension Structure:
12. Consequent to adjustments, post the Sixth CPC report, the levels of pensions for various ranks in the Officer Cadre, as also family pensions, have been promulgated vide a MoD letter of 15 Nov 2010. These are indicated below –
Serial
Rank
Officer’s Pension
Family Pension
(a)
Lt (Army)
Rs 13,500
Rs 8,100
(b)
Capt (Army)
Rs 13,850
Rs 8,310
(c)
Major
Rs 14,100
Rs 8,460
(d)
Lt Col
Rs 25,700
Rs 15,420
(e)
Col
Rs 26,050
Rs 15,630
(f)
Brigadier
Rs 26,150
Rs 15,690
(g)
Major General
Rs 26,700
Rs 16,020
(h)
Lt General
Rs 36,500
Rs 21,900
(j)
Army Commander
Rs 40,000
Rs 24,000
(k)
Army Chief
Rs 45,000
Rs 27,000
13. The table indicates qualifying service from 10 years to 30 years and the amount of pension indicated is inclusive of the Rank weightage admissible that varies from 9 years for Lt (Army) to 3 years for a General.

Service required for maximum pension:
14. Pension in a rank, varies depending on the length of service that plateaus at different levels, depending on the Rank in which the Officer retired, as shown below
(a)
Lt(Army) to Capt (Army)
24 Years
(b)
Major
25 Years
(c)
Lt Col(TS)
28 Years
(d)
Lt Col (Select)
26 Years
(e)
Col(TS &Select)
26 Years
(f)
Brigadier
28 Years
(g)
Major General and above
30 Years
15. From the above it is obvious, that the Pay Band structure coupled with a methodology of adjusting pensions at the minimum of the Pay Band in the subsequent Pay Commission is designed to cause dissatisfaction in the Armed Forces, but is perfectly suited to the changes invoked by the Sixth CPC for the AIS and Organised Group A Services, where officers will stagnate (if this is the correct term) at the highest levels, all crossing the HAG barrier, whereas, in the Armed Forces 99% officers will stagnate in Pay Band 4.

Fault lines in the pension structure:
16. These are indicated below-

· The difference of pension of a Lt Col ( Select) who retires after 26 years of service is only Rs. 1,000 less than a Major General with over 30 years service
· The difference in pension between a Col (Battalion Commander) and a Brigadier (Brigade Commander), who retired before 1 Jan 2006, is Rs 100. (3 cone ice-creams or one bottle of rum and a packet of Lays)
· The difference in pension between a Lt Col and Brigadier, who retired prior to 1 Jan 2006, is Rs 450. And the rank of Brigadier is attained after an officer qualifies two promotion Boards.
· Artificial gulfs have been created between Majors and Lt Colonels (Rs 11,600) and also between Major Generals and Lt Generals, non C-in C (Rs 9,800). The question is whether the convenience to adhering to artificially created barriers is logical and acceptable.
· For ranks at the bottom of the scale (PB - 3 and higher), the pensionary awards are reasonable i.e. in the ranks of Lt (Army), Lt Col, Lt Gens and above. Offcourse as brought out earlier, the Armed Forces need to press for an enhancement of Grade pay of Lt Col from Rs 8000 to Rs 8700,which was a faulty and arbitrary dispensation, when it became inevitable for the Govt to bring Lt Col's to Pay Band -4.
· For ranks not mentioned above, the pensionary awards should have been spaced out more evenly for pensions. In this connection, the Sixth CPC found no difficulty in creating four Pay Bands above the SAG scale i.e. HAG, HAG+, Secy to the Govt of India and Cabinet Secy scales. However, they only devised a single scale below SAG, which has caused so much heart burn in the Armed Forces, since 99% officers currently retire in that scale, as against 100% IAS officers who go up to the Apex scale.

Recommendations on OROP:
17. In my opinion, on first principle, the Armed Forces Officer, must be given the same benefits sanctioned by the Govt for officers of the organised Group A services, as successive Pay Commissions have ruled that, there should be pay parity between officers of the Armed Forces and the Group A services in general and the Indian Police, in particular. Even the Sixth CPC, have not made any comment to the contrary. Further, this needs to be done, immediately, as there is no justification whatsoever, for stymieing pay progression of an Armed Forces officer, on a non- functional basis(not linked to the extant rank structure) for pay enhancement up to the HAG level. It is only then that we can achieve a true OROP. Since this is an acceptable principle for the AIS and the Organised Group A services, there is no rationale for excluding Armed Forces Officers from this scheme. Ofcourse, it will actually benefit officers who will retire in the future, yet it will have to be taken into account, for pension fixation for those who retired before the next CPC. It may be relevant to point out that Lt Gens(non C -in C ) were placed in PB -4,by the Sixth CPC, but were subsequently raised to the HAG + scale after hardnosed negotiations, notwithstanding the fact that they were not in this scale, when they retired. Hence there is no reason, why Colonels and Brigadiers cannot also finally attain the HAG grade prior to retirement. This will only place them at par with their counterparts in the Group A services. Furthermore, a precedent exists in the fifth CPC, where Brigadiers owing to Rank Pay, drew more pension than a Maj Gen.

18. I believe that the dividing line for promotions in the Armed Forces is extremely fine and with promotional posts so limited, even outstanding Officers are not promoted, due to deep selection. We therefore cannot lose this opportunity of also taking Colonels and Brigadiers to the HAG scale, on a non - functional, pay promotion basis. In the Armed Forces, the rank and command structures are well defined and understood. Even today, a Colonel serving in the glacier or, a Capt(Navy) from the Aviation or submarine arms, would draw more pay in real terms than a Maj General or a Rear Admiral from the the general service. But that does not dilute the command structure. Yet, I know that there will be some reservations amongst the top management of the Armed Forces to accept this, whose doubts will be fuelled by those in the Finance Ministry. However could those at the helm of the Finance Ministry, then explain their actions with regard to the assured career progression from Pay Band -3, up to the HAG scale, for themselves and also for the Organised Group A services? My biggest fear is that if this anomaly is not corrected, then in the next Pay Commission, these differences will be fully exploited to further dilute, the status and pay of Armed Forces officers. This therefore requires immediate correction.

19. Notwithstanding the above, we need to also readjust pensionary benchmarks, for our retired fraternity, so that the differences in pension compensate a retired officer meaningfully, for his length of service and rank, in which he retired. Also, protecting the officers who retired, before changes in the time spent in the lower ranks was reduced, post the AVS Committee report. The methodology, of bunching various ranks and bringing them down to the minimum of the Pay Band, is clearly unsuited to the Armed Forces. Horizontal bands or striations are necessary and desirable. Taking into account the table at para 12 above, the following minimum pensions are suggested:-

(a) Lt(Army) - Rs 13,500.(No change, as an officer who retired in this rank, would have spent, only 3-4 years, as a commissioned officer)
(b) Capt (Army) - Rs 16,500. (As an officer in this rank would have spent 11 years as a commissioned officer)
(c) Major - Rs 19,500 (An officer who retired in this rank, would have at least completed time for pension i.e. 20 years)
(d) Lt Col - Rs 25,700. (No change, as this pension is given to a Lt Col, who has completed 26 years of service)
(e) Brigadier - Rs 31,500. (An officer who retired in this rank, even prematurely, would have completed at least 32 years of service)
(f) Major Gen - Rs 33,500. (This pension is recommended as less than 1% of Armed Forces officers attain Flag Rank)

OROP -Other Ranks:
20. In this paper, I have not discussed this subject, as there are many other factors that are quite different as compared to Officers. Firstly their careers are truncated to a far greater extent. Secondly, although their pensions are decided at the top of the scale in which they retired, even with the assured career progression approved by the Sixth CPC, they may not be able to get the third pay promotion before they retire, unlike civil servants. Consequent to the Sixth Pay Commission awards, there were positive changes made to the modified assured career progression methodology for civilians that have so far not been made applicable to the other ranks of the Armed Forces. This is therefore a subject that needs to be considered separately, which will follow in a subsequent article.

Conclusion:
21. This paper seeks to bring out issues that, if not corrected, will result in a sense of despondency and disillusionment amongst the officer cadre of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces officer does not desire more compensation, either in his service career or after his retirement. He just wants, what justifiably should have come his way, without having to fight for his rights. Lowering of his status and thereby his pay, without a valid reason, cannot help keep his morale high. Unfortunately the Armed Forces have never shown the resolve they display in battle, as do when it comes to matters pertaining to their pay and perks. This is all the more reason, why they should be treated with the respect that is their due.
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